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Abstract
We present three syntactic forcing models for coherent logic. These are based
on sites whose underlying category only depends on the signature of the coherent
theory, and they do not presuppose that the logic has equality. As an application we
give a coherent theory T and a sentence ψ which is T -redundant (for any geometric
implication ϕ, possibly with equality, if T + ψ ` ϕ, then T ` ϕ), yet false in the
generic model of T . This answers in the negative a question by Wraith.
1 Introduction
Coherent logic concerns implications between positive formulas, those built up from atoms
using only the connectives >, ⊥, ∨, ∧ and ∃. A first-order theory T is coherent if it is
axiomatized by sentences of the form ∀~x. ϕ → ψ where ϕ, ψ are positive formulas. Such
sentences are also called coherent implications or coherent sentences.1 Any coherent
implication is equivalent to a finite conjunction of sentences of the form
∀~x. (ϕ0 → ∃~x1.ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃~xk.ϕk), (1)
where the ϕi are conjunctions of atoms, and we can and will thus always assume that
any coherent theory T is presented by axioms of this form.
Coherent theories include all universal Horn theories. The axioms of equality are all
coherent implications, and over logic with equality all algebraic theories, as well as the
theories of fields and local rings, are coherent. Coherent implications form a Glivenko
class, i.e., if a coherent implication is derivable from a coherent theory using classical
logic, then it is already so derivable intuitionistically. Furthermore, they are preserved by
the inverse image parts of geometric morphisms between toposes, and for every coherent
theory T there is a generic model MT in a sheaf topos Set[T ], called the classifying topos
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1NB Sometimes positive formulas are also called coherent formulas, but a coherent sentence in our
sense need not be a coherent formula in this sense.
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of T , classifying models of T in any sheaf topos (cf. Section 4.1 for precise definitions).
The geometric perspective offered by sheaf toposes also motivates the introduction of ge-
ometric theories, those axiomatized by geometric implications, i.e., implications between
infinitary positive formulas, or equivalently, those with axioms of the form (1) where the
disjunction is allowed to be infinite (as usual when dealing with infinitary fragments, we
require that all formulas only have finitely many free variables). We assume the existence
of a Grothendieck universe or some other means of talking about small sets. We then
only consider infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions indexed by small sets.
The generic model of a coherent theory T can be thought of as a forcing model, and in
this paper we present three other forcing models for coherent logic without equality, pro-
viding proofs of soundness and completeness. The models can be understood as living in
certain sheaf toposes, and in a companion paper we shall characterize these as classifying
toposes of certain geometric theories related to T .
A main goal of the current paper is to answer the following question of Wraith:
The problem of characterising all the non-geometric properties of a generic
model appears to be difficult. If the generic model of a geometric theory T
satisfies a sentence α then any geometric consequence of T + (α) has to be a
consequence of T . We might call α T -redundant. Does the generic T -model
satisfy all T -redundant sentences? [17, p. 336]
We shall answer this in the negative, even for a coherent theory T . For the current volume
in honour of Brouwer it is appropriate to clarify that the question makes constructive
sense, and that our answer is constructive too. The proper understanding of Wraith’s
question requires a fair amount of categorical logic, which we develop in Section 2. For
the construction of the generic model we rely on Coste and Coste [3]. These preparations
postpone the proof of the negative answer to Wraith’s question until the very last section
of this paper. Therefore we find it useful to sketch this proof already here.
We shall give a consistent coherent theory T and a sentence ψ such that both ψ
and ¬ψ are T -redundant. Since the generic model of T cannot satisfy both ψ and ¬ψ,
this provides a negative answer to Wraith’s question. However, this answer is not as
informative as one would hope: one would like to know which one of ψ and ¬ψ is true in
the generic model of T . For this we have to take closer look at the argument why both
ψ and ¬ψ are T -redundant.
Soundness for our forcing models means that every intuitionistic consequence (coher-
ent or not, possibly with =) of T is forced. In fact, we prove soundness for all infinitary
formulas, including all geometric implications. Geometric completeness means that any
(generalized) geometric implication without = that is forced is an intuitionistic conse-
quence of the coherent theory.
Now let ψ be any sentence without = that is forced in any one of our models. Let
ϕ be a geometric implication without = such that ψ → ϕ is intuitionistically provable
in T . Then by soundness ψ → ϕ is forced, and hence ϕ is forced. Since ϕ is geometric
without = it follows by geometric completeness that ϕ is provable in T without using ψ.
A sentence like ψ is thus T -redundant in logic without equality. It can then be shown by
a cut-elimination argument that ψ is also T -redundant in logic with equality.
The actual example we give of a coherent theory T and T -redundant sentences ψ
and ¬ψ does not involve = and is moreover relational, that is, in a signature without
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functions. The T -redundancy follows from vs ψ and rn ¬ψ, using two of our forcing
models. The final step in the constructive answer to Wraith’s question is the observation
that, due to the relational signature, vs exactly characterizes truth in the generic model
of T . In other words, the example sentence ¬ψ is T -redundant, yet false in the generic
model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall in a mostly self-
contained way some preliminaries on site models in sheaf toposes. Then in Section 3 we
introduce our site models, which we then compare to the generic model in Section 4. We
carry out a uniform completeness proof in Section 5, and we give examples in Section 6.
We would like to emphasize that although we include a fair amount of categorical logic
in Sections 2 and 4, our forcing models and the accompanying soundness and completeness
results can be understood without this machinery. Moreover, all results are constructively
valid.
2 Preliminaries on sheaf toposes
We shall in this section briefly recall the main definitions and some auxiliary results
concerning models in sheaf toposes. We refer to [8, 9] for detailed expositions.
We begin with the notion of a Grothendieck topology on a small category C and ways
to present these. We write y : C → PSh(C) for the Yoneda embedding of C into the
presheaf topos PSh(C) consisting of functors Cop → Set: y(C) = HomC(–, C). If P is a
presheaf, f : D → C in C and x ∈ P (C), we write xf for the action P (f)(x) of f on x
so that if also g : E → D, then x(fg) = (xf)g.
A sieve on an object C is a subobject S ⊆ y(C) in PSh(C), viz., a collection of
morphisms in C with codomain C closed under precomposition with arbitrary morphisms.
A set of arrows U with codomain C is called a C-sink ; in particular, we think of sieves
on C as certain C-sinks. For g : D → C a morphism with codomain C and S a C-sink,
we define the D-sink g∗(S) to be the set {h | cod(h) = D ∧ gh ∈ S}. This is a sieve
whenever S is.
Definition 2.1. A Grothendieck topology on C is a function J that assigns to every object
C a collection J(C) of sieves on C, such that
(i) the maximal sieve { f | cod(f) = C } denoted by tC is in J(C);
(ii) (stability) if S ∈ J(C) and g : D → C, then g∗(S) is in J(D);
(iii) (transitivity) if S ∈ J(C) and R is any sieve on C such that f ∗(R) ∈ J(D) for every
f : D → C in S, then R is in J(C).
A category C with a Grothendieck topology is called a site. If U and V are C-sinks,
we say that U refines V if every f ∈ U factors through some g ∈ V . A C-sink U is called
a J-cover if there exists S ∈ J(C) refining U .
It is often useful to present a topology using a basis or a (saturated) coverage:
Definition 2.2. A basis for a Grothendieck topology on a category C with finite limits
consists of a relation C between objects C of C and C-sinks U (if C C U we say that U
is a basic cover of C) such that the following conditions hold:
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(i) if f : D → C is an isomorphism, then C C {f};
(ii) if C C U and g : D → C, then D C {g∗f | f ∈ U};
(iii) if C C U and D C Vf for each f : D → C in U , then C C
⋃
f∈U fVf .
Here and below g∗f is the pullback of f along g. In case C does not admit finite limits,
we have to replace (ii) by a weaker condition, namely that of a coverage. A coverage on
a small category C consists of a relation C between objects C of C and C-sinks U such
that
(ii’) if C C U , and g : D → C, then there exists V B D such that gV refines U .
If a coverage also satisfies the conditions (i) and (iii), then it will be called a saturated
coverage.2 Note that every basis is a saturated coverage by choosing V = {g∗f | f ∈ U}
in (ii’).
The reader may check that every saturated coverage generates a topology by letting
J(C) consist of those S for which there exists U B C such that U ⊆ S (i.e., U refines S,
by the closure property of a sieve S).
Lemma 2.3. Let C be a saturated coverage on C. If C C U and C C V , then U and V
have a common refinement.
Proof. Let C C U, V . By (ii’) there exists for every g : D → C in V a Wg B D such
that gWg refines U . Then by (iii) we have
⋃
g∈V gWg B C refining both U and V per
construction.
Definition 2.4. Let C be a category and U a C-sink for some C ∈ C. Write U =
{fi : Ci → C}i∈I . Let P : Cop → Set be a presheaf. A compatible family of elements
si ∈ P (Ci) for U is one such that whenever g : D → Ci and h : D → Cj satisfy fig = fjh,
then sig = sjh.
It is clear that if C has pullbacks, then it suffices to check compatibility at each
pullback corner Ci ×C Cj (it is of course necessary, too). A matching family for a sieve
S is just a compatible family, but in this case it suffices to check that xfg = xfg for all
f ∈ S and all g. This just amounts to a natural transformation S → P .
Definition 2.5. A presheaf P : Cop → Set is a sheaf for the coverage C, if for every
object C ∈ C, every U B C, and every compatible family of elements (sf )f∈U for U , there
exists a unique element s ∈ P (C) such that sf = sf for all f ∈ U .
By an adaptation of the argument of [9, Prop. III.4.1] we have for a coverage satisfying
(iii) that P is a sheaf for C iff P is a sheaf for the generated topology, in the sense that
whenever S ↪→ yC is a covering sieve and S → P is a compatible family, there is a unique
morphism yC → P (i.e., an element of P (C)) making the triangle commute:
S P
yC
2Beware that this terminology is not quite standard: a “saturated coverage” is sometimes required to
satisfy as well (iv) if U B C refines a C-sink V , then already V B C. Saturated coverages in this sense
are in bijection with Grothendieck topologies.
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Definition 2.6. For a Grothendieck topology J or a saturated coverage C on C, let
Sh(C, J), resp. Sh(C,C), be the full subcategory of PSh(C) consisting of sheaves wrt. J ,
resp. C. If J or C can be inferred from the context, we just write Sh(C). A category
equivalent to one of this form is called a Grothendieck topos or a sheaf topos.
Example 2.7. For any small category C, the topology J consisting just of the maximal
sieves, J(C) = {tC}, is called the trivial topology. It is generated by the saturated
coverage B where U B C if and only if U = {f} with f : C ′ → C an isomorphism. In
this way every presheaf is a sheaf, so PSh(C) = Sh(C), the presheaf topos, is indeed a
sheaf topos.
The inclusion functor i : Sh(C, J) ↪→ PSh(C) has a left adjoint, a : PSh(C) →
Sh(C, J), called the associated sheaf functor, cf. [9, Sect. III.5].3 The unit of the adjunc-
tion η is a natural transformation with components ηP : P → aP for each presheaf P (we
write η for ηP when no confusion can arise). Elements of aP (C) are given by equivalences
classes of locally compatible families for covers U B C: families of elements si ∈ P (Ci)
for each fi : Ci → C in U such that for every i, j, and g : D → Ci and h : D → Cj such
that fig = fjh, the elements sig = sjh are locally equal. The latter means that there is is
a further cover V B D such that sigk = sjhk for every k ∈ V .
Two locally compatible families are equivalent if they agree locally on a cover that
refines the corresponding covers. More precisely, if si ∈ P (Ci) and tj ∈ P (Cj) are locally
compatible families for U B C and V B C, respectively, then they are equivalent if there
exists W B C refining both U and V , such that for all h : D → C in W and any way h
factors through U and through V , say h = fihi = gjhj with fi ∈ U and gj ∈ V , we have
that sihi and tjhj are locally equal in D. Note that the particular i and j depend on the
factorization and that there is at least one of each for each h.
2.1 Geometric morphisms
The natural notion of a morphism between sheaf toposes E ,F is that of a geometric
morphism F : E → F . This is a pair of adjoint functors,
E F
F∗
F ∗
, F ∗ a F∗,
such that F ∗ preserves finite limits. Here, F ∗ is called the inverse image functor and F∗ is
called the direct image functor. The geometric morphisms from E to F form a category,
Hom(E ,F) where the morphisms are natural transformations between the inverse image
parts (or equivalently between the direct image parts in the opposite direction). Cf., e.g.,
Chapter VII of [9] for more information about geometric morphisms.
The first example of a geometric morphism is the inclusion of the sheaf topos into the
presheaf topos on a site C, (a a i) : Sh(C) → PSh(C). The direct image functor is the
inclusion functor and the inverse image functor is the associated sheaf functor, which is
indeed left exact (in particular, it preserves monomorphisms).
3 This functor is also called sheafification. We note that its definition is constructive for topologies
generated by coverages with finite covers. Otherwise, known definitions require either choice for the sets
indexing the covers or impredicative quantification.
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We now wish to consider geometric morphisms between sheaf toposes induced by
functors between the underlying sites. Recall that any functor F : C→ D between small
categories induces adjunctions
PSh(C) PSh(D)
F!
F∗
F ∗
with F! a F ∗ a F∗. Here, F ∗ is just composition with F , while F! and F∗ are the left and
right Kan extensions along F . Since F ∗ is a right adjoint, it preserves all limits, so the
pair (F ∗ a F∗) gives a geometric morphism F : PSh(C)→ PSh(D).
We first consider the conditions under which this induces a geometric morphism F :
Sh(C)→ Sh(D) when C and D are sites.
Definition 2.8. A functor F : C → D between sites is a comorphism of sites if it has
the following:
Covering lifting property For any cover V B F (C) in D with C ∈ C, there is a cover
U B C in C such that F (U) refines V .
The following result is essentially [8, C2.3.18], where the above property is called
cover-reflecting (see also [9, Theorem VII.10.5]).
Theorem 2.9. Let F : C → D be a functor between sites. Then the following are
equivalent:
(i) F is a comorphism.
(ii) There is a geometric morphism Sh(C)→ Sh(D) whose inverse image functor is the
composite
Sh(D) i−→ PSh(D) F ∗−→ PSh(C) a−→ Sh(C).
(iii) F∗ : PSh(C)→ PSh(D) maps sheaves to sheaves.
For use in Section 4.2 we recall the following basic result about comorphisms of sites,
which follows from [8, C2.3.18]:
Lemma 2.10. If Q ∈ PSh(D) is a presheaf, and F : C→ D a comorphism of sites, then
the natural map aF ∗(ηQ) : aF ∗(Q)→ aF ∗(aQ) is an isomorphism in Sh(C).
Sometimes a functor F : C→ D induces a geometric morphism Sh(D)→ Sh(C) in a
contravariant way via the adjoint pair (F! a F ∗). In this case, the left exactness of F! is
not automatic, which is one reason the corresponding definition has two components:
Definition 2.11. A functor F : C→ D between sites is a morphism of sites if it satisfies
the following two properties:
Cover preserving If U B C in C, then there is a cover V B FC refining F (U).
Covering-flat If A : I → C is a finite diagram in C, then every cone over FA factors
locally through the F -image of a cone over A.
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The notion of being covering-flat can be slightly strengthened by removing the word
“locally” from the definition. A functor satisfying this condition is called representably
flat. Of course, if C and D have finite limits and F preserves them, then F is representably
flat, and a fortiori covering-flat. See also the discussion in [15], where we find:
Theorem 2.12. If F : C→ D is a morphism of sites, then there is geometric morphism
Sh(D) → Sh(C) whose direct image functor is the restriction of F ∗ : PSh(D) → PSh(C)
to sheaves.
2.2 Structures for a signature
We fix a first-order signature Σ throughout the sequel. We give all definitions for the
case of a single-sorted signature, leaving the details concerning the many-sorted case to
the reader.
Definition 2.13. A structure for Σ in a sheaf topos Sh(C, J) consists of a sheaf M (the
carrier) together with morphisms JfKM : Mn →M for every n-ary function symbol, and
subobjects of Mn denoted JP KM ↪→Mn for every n-ary predicate symbol. The latter two
are often left implicit when we speak about a structure or model M .
A homomorphism of Σ-structures is a morphisms g : M → M ′ that respects the
interpretations of function and predicate symbols.
Any formula ϕ(~x) with free variables among the ~x = x1, . . . , xn, gives rise to a sub-
object Jϕ(~x)KM ↪→ Mn, defined by recursion on the structure of ϕ using the structure
ingredients in the base cases. This semantics has an explicit description in terms of the
forcing relation:
Definition 2.14. Given an object C ∈ C and a tuple of elements α ∈M(C)n = Mn(C).
If ϕ(~x) is a formula with n free variables, then we say that C forces ϕ(α), denoted C M
ϕ(α), iff α factors through Jϕ(~x)K ↪→Mn, where we consider α as a map ayC →Mn.
The forcing relation enjoys the following two properties:
Monotonicity If C M ϕ(α) and f : D → C, then D M ϕ(αf).
Local Character If U B C is such that C ′ M ϕ(αf) for every f : C ′ → C in U , then
C M ϕ(α).
We now have the following result, which is a slight variation of [9, Theorem VI.7.1], using
the fact that any cover for a topology generated by a saturated coverage is refined by a
cover in the coverage (by definition).
Theorem 2.15. Given a structure M in a sheaf topos Sh(C,C), where C is a saturated
coverage on C, we have:
• C M > always;
• C M ⊥ iff there is a cover U B C with U empty;
• C M
∧
i∈I ϕi(α) iff C M ϕi(α) for all i ∈ I;
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• C M
∨
i∈I ϕi(α) iff there is a cover U B C such that for every f : C ′ → C in U ,
there is some i ∈ I such that C ′ M ϕi(αf);
• C M ϕ(α)→ ψ(α) iff for every f : C ′ → C we have C ′ M ψ(αf) if C ′ M ϕ(αf);
• C M ∀x.ϕ(x, α) iff for every f : C ′ → C and every β ∈M(C ′), C ′ M ϕ(β, αf);
• C M ∃x.ϕ(x, α) iff there is a cover U B C such that for every f : C ′ → C in U ,
there is some β ∈M(C ′) such that C ′ M ϕ(β, αf).
For a sentence ϕ, we write M ϕ if C M ϕ for all C ∈ C. Of course, if C has a
terminal object 1, then this is equivalent to 1 M ϕ.
Definition 2.16. Given a theory T and a structure M in Sh(C,C), we say that M is a
model of T if M ϕ for every sentence ϕ in T .
It is known that the forcing semantics is sound [8, D1.3.2] and complete [8, D1.4.11]
for first-order intuitionistic logic (since sheaf toposes are Heyting categories). In fact, one
can construct a single sheaf topos with a model M of the first-order theory T such that
M ϕ iff `T ϕ for all sentences ϕ [13, Corollary 5.6]. We give a similar completeness
proof for coherent logic below in Theorem 5.8.
For future use we record the following refinements of the quantifier cases of Theo-
rem 2.15.
Lemma 2.17. If M = aP for some presheaf P , then we have for every α : ayC →Mn :
• C M ∀x.ϕ(x, α) iff for every f : C ′ → C and every β ∈ P (C ′), C ′ M ϕ(ηP (β), αf);
• C M ∃x.ϕ(x, α) iff there is a cover U B C such that for every f : C ′ → C in U ,
there is some β ∈ P (C ′) such that C ′ M ϕ(ηP (β), αf).
Furthermore, if P = yD is representable and C has finite products, then:
• C M ∀x.ϕ(x, α) iff C ×D M ϕ(pi2, αpi1), where pi2 ∈ ayD(C ×D) is the element
corresponding to the projection C ×D → D. Also, αpi1 : ay(C ×D)→Mn.
Proof. The first points follow from local character of forcing, together with the fact that
every element of aP (C ′) is locally of the form ηP (γ) for some γ ∈ P (C ′′) (and transitivity
of covers in the case of the existential quantifier).
The last point is Remark VI.7.2 in [9].
If f : E → F is a geometric morphism of sheaf toposes, and M ∈ F is a model of
a coherent theory T , then f ∗M is a model of T in E . This illustrates the important
relationship between coherent (and more generally, geometric) theories and toposes and
geometric morphisms. We shall return to this relationship in the next subsection and in
Section 4.
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2.3 Generalized geometric implications
The following variation on the class of geometric implications will be used in our com-
pleteness proofs in Section 5.
Definition 2.18. The class of generalized geometric implications is generated by the
following grammar:
ϕ ::= α | (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) |
(∨
i∈I
ϕi
) | (∃x.ϕ) | (∀x.ϕ) | (α→ ϕ)
where I ranges over small index sets and α ::= p(~t ) | > | ⊥ | (s = t) is an atomic formula.
Note that geometric implications are not strictly speaking generalized geometric im-
plications, but easy equivalents can be obtained via the equivalence of α1 ∧ · · · ∧αn → ϕ
and α1 → · · · → αn → ϕ.
Also note that there are (even finitary) generalized geometric implications that are
not equivalent to any geometric implication, e.g., p ∨ (p→ ⊥) for atomic p.
Among first-order formulas, the generalized geometric implications are up to equiv-
alence those that do not contain negative occurrences of implications nor of universal
quantifiers, cf. [11, Theorem 3.2] where the term generalized geometric implications refers
to first-order formulas.
Theorem 2.19. Let F : E → F be a geometric morphism, and M ∈ F a Σ-structure.
For any generalized geometric implication ϕ in variables x1, . . . , xn, we have an inclusion
of subobjects of (F ∗M)n ' F ∗(Mn):
F ∗JϕKM ≤ JϕKF ∗M .
In particular, if ϕ is a sentence and JϕKM = >, then JϕKF ∗M = >.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The inverse image functor preserves atomic formulas, conjunc-
tion, disjunction, and existential quantification. Hence it remains to consider implication
and universal quantification.
Note that if f : P → Q is any morphism in F and A a subobject of P , then F ∗(∀fA) ≤
∀F ∗f (F ∗A), cf. [9, IX.6.(17)]. And if B is another subobject of P , then implication can
be expressed as (A⇒ B) = ∀a(A∧B), where a : A→ P is the inclusion of the subobject
A. Hence F ∗(A⇒ B) = F ∗(∀a.A ∧B) ≤ ∀F ∗a(F ∗A ∧ F ∗B) = (F ∗A⇒ F ∗B).
For an implication α→ ϕ, we now have
F ∗Jα→ ϕKM = F ∗(JαKM ⇒ JϕKM) ≤ (F ∗JαKM ⇒ F ∗JϕKM)
= (JαKF ∗M ⇒ F ∗JϕKM) ≤ (JαKF ∗M ⇒ JϕKF ∗M) = Jα→ ϕKF ∗M ,
using the fact that atomic formulas are preserved. The case for a universal quantifier is
similar.
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3 Categories of forcing conditions
In this section we define three categories of forcing conditions and do the groundwork for
their sheaf toposes based on a coherent theory T without equality. We assume a fixed
but arbitrary signature Σ of a first-order language. Phrases like term, atom, formula,
sentence refer to the well known syntactic entities. Let X = {x0, x1, . . .} be a countably
infinite set of variables; metavariables x, y, z range over X. Let Tm(X) denote the set of
Σ-terms over X ⊆ X.
Definition 3.1. The category Cts has objects denoted as pairs (X;A), where X is a
finite subset of X and A is a finite set of atoms in the language defined by Σ and X.
The latter means that only variables from X may occur in A. Such pairs (X;A) are
called conditions. The morphisms of Cts are denoted as f : (Y ;B)→ (X;A), where f is
a term substitution X → Tm(Y ) such that Af ⊆ B. Here and below, Af denotes the
application of the substitution f to A.
Clearly, Cts is a category. We have id(X;A) : (X;A)→ (X;A) with underlying function
the inclusion X → Tm(X). If f : (Z;C) → (Y ;B) and g : (Y ;B) → (X;A), then
g ◦ f : (Z;C)→ (X;A) is defined by the composition of substitutions gf : X → Tm(Z)
which sends a variable x ∈ X to the term xgf ∈ Tm(Z). Here and below we use
diagram composition for the substitutions underlying the morphisms. This works well in
combination with postfixing substitutions: A(g ◦ f) = A(gf) = (Ag)f , where one can
read gf both as the ordinary composition of morphisms and as the diagram composition
of the underlying substitutions.
Conditions will be denoted as, e.g., (x, y, z; p(z), q(f(x), z, z)). Substitutions will be
denoted as, e.g., [y := x, z := g(x)]. The category Cts has a terminal object (; ) with
unique morphisms [] : (X;A)→ (; ).
Definition 3.2. The category Cvs is the subcategory of Cts that has the same objects but
in which the morphisms f : (Y ;B) → (X;A) are required to be variable substitutions.
These are simply functions X → Y thought of as functions X → Tm(Y ).
Note that if the signature is purely relational, then the categories Cts and Cvs coincide.
Definition 3.3. The category Crn is the subcategory of Cvs that has the same objects
but in which the morphisms are required to be injective (when considered as functions
between sets of variables). Such variable substitutions are commonly called renamings,
whence the subscripts in Cvs,Crn.
Discussion 3.4. The above definitions clearly take the nominal approach to conditions.
In the nominal approach it is important to avoid name conflicts. Also, the nominal
approach gives rise to many isomorphisms, such as between (x0; p(x0)) and (x1; p(x1)).
Such isomorphisms do no harm, but are not very useful either. Alternatively, it would
be possible to take X = N and use de Bruijn indices [1]. The two conditions above
would then become one condition (1; p(0)). In the approach with de Bruijn indices the
conditions are of the form (n;A) with all numbers occurring in A less than n. Morphisms
(m;B) → (n;A) are functions f : [n] → Tm([m]) such that Af ⊆ B. Here [k] denotes
the set {0, . . . , k−1}, for each k ∈ N. With de Bruijn indices there are no name conflicts.
However, de Bruijn-indices are more difficult to read and we shall only use them to resolve
name conflicts.
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Discussion 3.5. In the above definitions we assumed the language to be single-sorted,
and we shall write most of the paper under this assumption, though very little would
have to change to accommodate multiple sorts. In this case, a condition (X;A) would
consist of a finite set X of sorted variables, and a finite set of atoms with variables from
X, and morphisms would be sort-respecting (injective, variable, term) substitutions.
3.1 Finite limits
Both Cvs and Crn inherit the terminal object (; ) from Cts. In this section we show that
Cvs actually has all finite limits. We also note that Cts has all finite products. However,
neither Cts nor Crn have equalizers: For Cts, consider the two arrows [x := 0], [x := 1] :
(; ) ⇒ (x; ) over a signature with constants 0, 1. They cannot by equalized. For Crn,
consider the two arrows [x := y], [x := z] : (y, z; ) ⇒ (x; ); they are equalized by the
non-injective variable substitution [y := w, z := w] : (w; )→ (y, z; ).
To see that Cvs has all finite limits, it suffices to check that in addition to a terminal
object it has pullbacks. So let (Y ;B)
f−→ (X;A) g←− (Z;C) be a cospan in Cvs. Let
W := Y unionsqX Z be a pushout of the span Y ← X → Z with corresponding map i : Y → W
and j : Z → W . Note that i and j are injective if f : X → Y and g : X → Z are. Let
D := Bi ∪ Cj. Then the following is a pullback square of conditions:
(W ;D) (Z;C)
(Y ;B) (X;A)
j
i g
f
(2)
Indeed, given any other span of conditions (Y ;B)
i′←− (W ′;D′) j′−→ (Z;C) such that the
analogous square commutes, there is a unique function h : W → W ′ factoring the corre-
sponding functions, and this gives a morphism of conditions h : (W ′;D′)→ (W ;D).
To see that Cts has all finite products, consider the square (2) in the case where (X;A)
is the terminal object (; ) and W is then the disjoint union of X and Y .
3.2 Coverages
Recall that a coherent theory T has an axiomatization in which every axiom is of the
form
∀~x. (ϕ0 → ∃~x1.ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃~xk.ϕk),
where the ϕi are conjunctions of atoms.
Definition 3.6. Let T be a coherent theory. We define an inductively generated relation
CT as in Definition 2.2 for the category Crn. Since Crn is a subcategory of Cts and Cvs
containing all isomorphisms, we have then also defined relations CT for Cts and Cvs. In
Theorem 3.8 we will verify that CT is a saturated coverage for all three categories, and
even a basis for a Grothendieck topology on Cvs.
f is an isomorphism with codomain (X;A)
(X;A) CT {f}
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(X,~x1;A,ϕ1) CT U1 . . . (X,~xn;A,ϕn) CT Un
(X;A) CT
⋃
1≤i≤n(eiUi)
(∗)
Here (∗) is the set of conditions sanctioning the application of the rule: the existence of
an instance ϕ0 → ∃~x1.ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃~xn.ϕn of an axiom in T with all free variables in X and
ϕ0 ⊆ A. We tacitly assume that name conflicts are avoided, either by using de Bruijn
indices, or by renaming the bound variables ~xi so that they are disjoint from X. The
morphisms ei : (X,~xi;A,ϕi) → (X;A) restrict to identities on X, and eiUi denotes the
collection of morphisms eif with f ∈ Ui. This completes (∗) and the definition of CT .
Lemma 3.7. Let T be a coherent theory and CT the relation as in Definition 3.6. If
(X;A) CT U , then (Y ;B) CT fU for every isomorphism f : (X;A)→ (Y ;B).
Proof. Since T is fixed, we drop the subscript in CT . By induction on the definition of
(X;A) C U . The base case is trivial, since composition preserves isomorphisms. For the
induction step, consider
(X,~x1;A,ϕ1) C U1 . . . (X,~xn;A,ϕn) C Un
(X;A) C
⋃
1≤i≤n(eiUi)
(∗)
and assume the lemma holds for the premises of the rule. Let f : (X;A)→ (Y ;B) be an
iso. We prove the desired result by the following inference:
(Y, ~x1;B,ϕ1f1) C f1U1 . . . (Y, ~xn;B,ϕnfn) C fnUn
(Y ;B) C
⋃
1≤i≤n(e
′
ifiUi)
(∗′)
Here every fi : (X,~x1;A,ϕ1) → (Y, ~x1;B,ϕ1f) is an isomorphism extending f with
identity substitutions for the ~xi. The e
′
i do for Y what the ei do for X. The justification
(∗′) of the inference is based on (ϕ0 → ∃~x1.ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃~xn.ϕn)f . For example, ϕ0 ⊆ A
implies ϕ0f ⊆ Af ⊆ B. We may waive name conflicts since we could have used de Bruijn
indices. It remains to prove feiUi = e
′
ifiUi for all i. This follows since, basically, the
ei do nothing on X, the e
′
i do nothing on Y , and the fi extend f (actually, we have
fei = e
′
ifi).
Theorem 3.8. Let T be a coherent theory and CT the relation as in Definition 3.6. The
relation CT is a saturated coverage for any of the categories Crn,Cvs,Cts and a basis for
a Grothendieck topology on Cvs.
Proof. Since T is fixed, we drop the subscript in CT . We have to verify conditions (i),
(ii’) and (iii) in Definition 2.2.
Condition (i) holds as per definition of the base case of CT .
We do (iii) before (ii’) since (iii) is easier. We prove (iii) by induction on the definition
of C C U . The base case, where U = {f} for some isomorphism f , is Lemma 3.7, which
holds for all three Crn,Cvs,Cts. For the induction step, consider
(X,~x1;A,ϕ1) C U1 . . . (X,~xn;A,ϕn) C Un
(X;A) C
⋃
1≤i≤n(eiUi)
(∗)
and assume (iii) holds for the premises of the rule. Assume Cij C Vij for all gij : Cij →
(X;A) in eiUi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let fij ∈ Ui, then gij = eifij ∈ eiUi, and we can use Cij C Vij
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also for fij. Hence by the induction hypothesis (X,~xi;A,ϕi) C
⋃
fij∈Ui fijVij, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
With these covers in hand we prove the desired result by the following inference:
(X,~x1;A,ϕ1) C
⋃
f1j∈U1 f1jV1j . . . (X,~xn;A,ϕn) C
⋃
fnj∈Un finVin
(X;A) C
⋃
1≤i≤n(ei
⋃
fij∈Ui fijVij)
(∗)
A routine verification shows that indeed⋃
1≤i≤n
(ei
⋃
fij∈Ui
fijVij) =
⋃
1≤i≤n
⋃
gij∈eiUi
gijVij,
which completes the proof of (iii).
We continue with (ii’), which we again prove by induction on the definition of C C U .
In the base case we have that C C {f} for some isomorphism f : C ′ → C. For any
g : D → C we take V = {idD} B D. Then it suffices to show that g = g idD factors
through f . This is immediate since g = (g k)f = g(kf) for the inverse k of f . For the
induction step, consider:
(X,~x1;A,ϕ1) C U1 . . . (X,~xn;A,ϕn) C Un
(X;A) C
⋃
1≤i≤n(eiUi)
(∗)
and assume (ii’) holds for the premises of the rule. Let g : (Y ;B) → (X;A) and define
gi : (Y, ~xi;B,ϕig) → (X,~xi;A,ϕi) extending g with ~xig = ~xi , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By
the induction hypothesis there exist Vi B (Y, ~xi;B,ϕig) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with exactly the
properties we need. Now consider the following inference:
(Y, ~x1;B,ϕ1g) C V1 . . . (Y, ~xn;B,ϕng) C Vn
(Y ;B) C
⋃
1≤i≤n(e
′
iVi)
(∗′)
One could say that this inference is the pullback along g of the previous one. Like in the
proof of Lemma 3.7 one easily verifies (∗′). We define V = ⋃1≤i≤n(e′iVi) and the following
commutative diagram (3) shows that V has the desired properties.
C ′ (Y, ~xi;B,ϕig) (Y ;B)
C (X,~xi;A,ϕi) (X;A)
k
hi∈Vi
gi
e′i
g
fi∈Ui ei
(3)
We have now proved (i), (ii’) and (iii) uniformly for Crn,Cvs,Cts. We proceed to
the proof of (ii) for Cvs, which is very similar to the proof above of (ii’). Again we use
induction on the definition of C C U . In the base case we have that C C {f} for some
isomorfism f : C ′ → C. We put V = {g∗f} and get D C V as pullback preserves
isos. In the induction step the only differences with the proof of (ii’) are: the covers
Vi = {g∗i fi | fi ∈ Ui} obtained by the induction hypothesis, and the diagram (3), which
is now a pullback diagram since the subdiagrams are pullbacks.
13
3.3 Canonical models
We have now defined, for any fixed coherent theory T , sheaf toposes Sh(C,C) for C =
Cts,Cvs,Crn, and we proceed to define a canonical model of T in each of these.
Definition 3.9. Let Tm denote the presheaf of terms over the signature in each PSh(C ),
so Tm(X;A) is the set of terms with parameters in X. Note that for Cts we have
Tm ∼= y(x; ), but not for Cvs,Crn. Now let M := a Tm denote the associated sheaf.
If f is an n-ary function symbol, define JfK : Mn → M by applying the associated
sheaf functor to the natural transformation Tmn → Tm that maps n terms ti at a
condition (X;A) to the term f(t1, . . . , tn).
If p is an n-ary predicate symbol, define JpK as the associated sheaf of the sub-
presheaf of Tmn that at a condition (X;A) consists of those tuples (t1, . . . , tn) for which
p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ A.
Remark 3.10. By the definition of the associated sheaf functor in terms of locally com-
patible families, this means that every element α ∈ M(X;A) is locally a term: there is
a cover U B (X;A) such that for every f : (Y ;B) → (X;A) in U , αf = η(t) for some
t ∈ Tm(Y ;B), and such a family of terms defines an element of M(X;A) if it is locally
compatible.
Likewise, the elements α1, . . . , αn ∈ M(X;A) satisfy (X;A) M p(α1, . . . , αn) for p
an n-ary predicate symbol, if and only if there is a cover U B (X;A) such that for every
f : (Y ;B)→ (X;A) in U , we have αif = η(ti) for some terms t1, . . . , tn ∈ Tm(Y ;B) and
p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ B.
Note in particular that (X;A) M ϕ if ϕ ⊆ A when ϕ is a conjunction of atoms
(here and in the sequel we elide the difference between a term t and the corresponding
element η(t)). Regarding the canonical interpretation of equality, if s, t ∈ Tm(X;A),
then (X;A) M s = t iff there is a cover U B (X;A) such that sf = tf for all f :
(Y ;B)→ (X;A) in U .
We need to check that these structures M actually give models of T . Consider an
axiom of T :
ϕ = ∀~x. (ϕ0 → ∃~x1.ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃~xk.ϕk),
which we take to be closed, where the ϕi are conjunctions of atoms. We must show
(; ) M ϕ, which by Theorem 2.15 amounts to showing for any condition (X;A) and any
instantiation of ~x over X such that the atoms in ϕ0 lie in A, we have
(X;A) M ∃~x1.ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃~xk.ϕk.
To construct a suitable cover of (X;A) we use the same instantiation in the step case of
Definition 3.6 and obtain a cover {ei}1≤i≤k B (X;A) using identity covers in the premises.
Indeed, for each i we have
(X,~xi;A,ϕi) M ∃~xi.ϕi,
with the identity instantiation of the ~xi because (X,~xi;A,ϕi) M ϕi.
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4 Comparison with the classifying topos
In this section we first recall in Subsection 4.1 some background on classifying toposes
as well as a convenient presentation due to Coste and Coste [3]. We then prove that for
a purely relational signature, Sh(Cvs,CT ) is the classifying topos of T . In Subsection 4.2
we study the geometric morphisms between the sheaf toposes corresponding to our sites.
4.1 Classifying toposes
The theory of classifying toposes is based on theories in logic with equality, so we need to
connect theories in logic without equality to ones in logic with equality. Given a coherent
theory T in logic without equality, let T= denote T expanded with an equality relation
and the (coherent) axioms ensuring this is a congruence with respect to the signature.
To discuss classifying toposes, let now T be a coherent theory in logic with equality (in
particular, the signature contains = and all equality axioms are assumed). Let ModT (E)
denote the category of models of T in E and homomorphisms between them. By the
remark at the end of Section 2.2, ModT (E) depends on E in a contravariant way for a
coherent theory T , as the inverse image part of a geometric morphism carries T -models
to T -models.
Definition 4.1. A classifying topos for T is a sheaf topos denoted Set[T ] equipped with
a generic model MT of T , i.e., the map F 7→ F ∗MT induces an equivalence of categories
Hom(E ,Set[T ]) 'ModT (E)
for every sheaf topos E .
Given T , the classifying topos and the generic model are by this universal property
uniquely determined up to unique equivalence and isomorphism.4
When T is a coherent theory in logic without equality, we say that a topos is a
classifying topos for T if it is a classifying topos for T=. This makes sense because any
model of T in a topos E is uniquely also a model of T= in the sense of logic with equality,
as equality must be interpreted by the equality of E .
There are several possible constructions of the classifying topos of a coherent theory
T (in logic with equality). We shall use a presentation that goes back to [3, p. 25], where
the classifying topos is constructed relative to a subtheory T 0 that is required to be
strict universal Horn, i.e., consisting only of axioms of the form (the universal closure of)
ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn → ψ, where the ϕi and ψ are atomic formulas.5 The site is based on a category
called the syntactic site of T 0, C0. This has as objects pairs (X;A) where X is a finite
set of variables, and A is a set of facts which may now include equalities. The morphisms
(X;A)→ (Y ;B) are equivalence classes of term substitutions f : Y → Tm(X) such that
T 0 together with the facts in A proves the facts in Bf . Two term substitutions f, g are
4It may of course happen for different theories T, T ′ that nevertheless Set[T ] ' Set[T ′], in which case
we say that the theories are Morita-equivalent.
5A general Horn theory also allows axioms where ψ is ⊥.
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equivalent if T 0 together with A proves yf = yg for each y ∈ Y .6 Note that C0 is a
category with all finite limits (by an argument similar to that of [8, D1.4.2]).
The theorem of [3, p. 25] (see also Proposition D3.1.10 of [8]) can now be phrased as
follows:
Theorem 4.2. The classifying topos T can be presented as Sh(C0,CT ), where CT is
generated as in Definition 3.6 using the axioms of T not in T 0. The generic model is
MT = ay(x; ).
Theorem 4.3. For a purely relational signature, Sh(Cvs,CT ) is canonically equivalent
to the classifying topos of T=.
Proof. Let C0 be the syntactic site from [3] over the base theory of equality (eq) in the
signature of T=. One difference between Cvs and C0 is that the objects of the latter may
contain equality atoms. By the assumption on the signature, equality atoms are all of the
form x = y. These can easily be eliminated via isomorphisms (X;A, x = x)→ (X;A) and
(X, y;A, x = y) → (X;A[y := x]). Adopting a standardized procedure for eliminating
equality atoms thus yields that the canonical fully faithful functor from Cvs to C0 is an
equivalence of categories. By induction on the definition of C CT U one proves that the
equivalence preserves covers both ways. Hence, the sites Cvs and C0 give equivalent sheaf
toposes, Sh(Cvs,CT ) ' Sh(C0,CT ). Now apply Theorem 4.2.
In a forthcoming paper we shall characterize the sheaf toposes Sh(Cx,CT ) as the
classifying toposes of certain extensions of the coherent theory T . As a preview, we note
that when the signature contains function symbols, Sh(Cvs,CT ) and the classifying topos
of T= can be quite different, cf. Example 6.2 below.
4.2 Comparison morphisms
Let us note that the toposes we have considered are related by a series of geometric
morphisms. Consider the string of canonical faithful functors
Crn Cvs Cts C0i
j k
where C0 is the syntactic site of the theory of equality (eq) in the signature of T= (using
either of the presentations given in Section 4.1). Giving each of these categories the
coverage corresponding to a coherent theory T , all the functors have the covering lifting
property, so we get a corresponding string of geometric morphisms
Sh(Crn) Sh(Cvs) Sh(Cts) Sh(C0) = Set[T ] (4)
ending with the classifying topos for T (using Theorem 4.2).
6The notion of syntactic site applies more generally to coherent theories, furnishing another con-
struction of the classifying topos with respect to a suitable topology, but in this case one takes as
morphisms the provably functional relations. For strict universal Horn theories the two notions coincide,
as can be seen, for instance, using the intuitionistic multi-succedent calculus of [12], where Horn axioms
ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ψ and the equality axioms are included as rules.
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Theorem 4.4. The inverse image functors map canonical models to canonical models.
Proof. Recall that the canonical models are given by a Tm for Crn and Cvs and ay(x; ) in
Cts and C0. Note by Lemma 2.10, we can compute the inverse image of these associated
sheaves by taking the inverse image of the presheaf and then sheafifying.
Now, for C ∈ Cts we have
k∗(y(x; ))(C) = y(x; )(kC) = HomC0(kC, (x; )) ' HomCts(C; (x; )) = y(x; )(C),
using that k is full as well as faithful. Thus, k∗(ay(x; )) ' ay(x; ) in Sh(Cts).
Then, for C ∈ Cvs we have j∗(y(x; ))(C) = HomCts(C, (x; )) ' Tm(C), so j∗(ay(x; )) '
a Tm in Sh(Cvs).
Finally, for C ∈ Crn we have i∗Tm(C) ' Tm(C), so i∗(a Tm) ' a Tm in Sh(Crn).
We see that the compositions through to Sh(C0) in (4) witness that the canonical
models are models of T .
Since i, j and k preserve covers, we can consider whether they are also covering-flat
and thus morphisms of sites, cf. Theorem 2.12.
Theorem 4.5. The inclusion functor j : Cvs → Cts is representably flat, and thus (j! a j∗)
gives rise to a geometric morphism from Sh(Cts) to Sh(Cvs).
The composite kj : Cvs → C0 preserves finite limits, and there is thus an induced
geometric morphism from Sh(C0) to Sh(Cvs).
Proof. We first need to show that for any finite diagram d in Cvs, any cone over d in Cts
factors through some cone over d in Cvs. But Cvs has finite limits, and we see from their
explicit description in Section 3.1 that any cone over d in Cts factors through the limiting
cone of d in Cvs.
The second statement is clear.
The considerations in the beginning of Section 3.1 that show that Crn and Cts fail to
have equalizers also show that i and k need not be covering-flat (take an empty theory
for instance).
One might hope that the morphisms in (4) are open, meaning that the inverse image
parts preserve first-order logic. For empty theories the coverages are trivial, and the
toposes are presheaf toposes. However, we have from [7, Proposition 2.6] that f : C→ D
induces an open geometric morphism PSh(C)→ PSh(D) iff for every C ∈ C and α : D →
f(C) in D, there is β : C ′ → C in C as well as γ : f(C ′) → D and δ : D → f(C ′) in D
with γδ = 1D and αγ = f(β). We construct counterexamples as follows: for i : Crn → Cvs
let α identify two variables; for j : Cvs → Cts let α be any non-variable term substitution;
for k : Cts → C0 let D contain an equation. Thus, in general none of the morphisms
in (4) are open.
5 Soundness and Completeness
In this section we prove for each of the canonical models in Sh(Crn), Sh(Cvs) and Sh(Cts):
soundness for a class of formulas that includes both first order intuitionistic formulas and
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(infinitary) geometric implications, and completeness for generalized geometric implica-
tions.
We write for rn, vs and ts for the forcing relations M for the canonical models
M in Crn, Cvs and Cts, respectively, or even just  when the category can be inferred
from the context.
If C = (X;A) is a condition, we write Fact(C) = A for the set of facts in C. In
Definition 3.9 we introduced the notation Tm(C) for the set of terms with free variables
in X.
We can reformulate Theorem 2.15 as a definition, referring only to actual terms (rather
than locally compatible families of terms), thus giving a forcing relation between condi-
tions and formulas which can be understood without any sheaf or topos machinery.
Definition 5.1. Let C be one of the categories Crn,Cvs or Cts and let C be any coverage
on C. For any condition C = (X;A) and any formula ϕ with free variables in X we define
the forcing relation C  ϕ by induction on ϕ as follows:
1. C  > always;
2. C  ⊥ if C C ∅;
3. C  ϕ if ϕ is a fact and there is U B C with ϕf ∈ Fact(D) for all f : D → C in U ;
4. C 
∧
i∈I ϕi if C  ϕi for all i ∈ I;
5. C 
∨
i∈I ϕi if there is U B C such that for all f : D → C in U , D  ϕif for some
i ∈ I;
6. C  ϕ1 → ϕ2 if for all maps f : D → C in C we have D  ϕ2f whenever D  ϕ1f ;
7. C  ∀x.ϕ if for all maps f : D → C we have D  ϕ[f, x := t] for all t ∈ Tm(D);
8. C  ∃x.ϕ if there is U B C such that, for all f : D → C in U , D  ϕ[f, x := t] for
some t ∈ Tm(D).
Theorem 5.2. If we take C to be CT as in Definition 3.6, then this definition of  agrees
with the one for the canonical model as in Definition 2.14 for all formulas.
Proof. This follows from local character in the base case, and Theorem 2.15 in the other
cases, together with Lemma 2.17 in the quantifier cases.
Remark 5.3. If we add to Definition 5.1 the clause
9. C  s = t if there is a cover U B C with sf = tf for all f : D → C in U ,
then Theorem 5.2 remains true when the interpretation of equality for M is the equality of
the corresponding topos. We can thus reason about equality in the canonical models even
though T is a theory in logic without equality. However, our completeness theorem below
does not hold for sentences formulated in logic with equality. Below we shall describe
what happens for sentences with = via a suitable extension of T .
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The only difference between the forcing relations of Definitions 2.14 and 5.1 is thus
that the former is defined for a wider class of formulas, namely those containing locally
compatible families of terms in place of ordinary terms. But by local character, we can
always reduce to the case of ordinary terms and formulas.
Having established Theorem 5.2, we inherit the properties of monotonicity and local
character also for the forcing relation of Definition 5.1.
Sometimes, the case of the universal quantifier simplifies as follows.
Lemma 5.4. For Cts, and hence in case of a purely relational signature also for Cvs, we
have for all conditions (X;A) and formulas ϕ (possibly with =) that (X;A)  ∀x.ϕ iff
(X, x;A)  ϕ.
Proof. This is just the last point of Lemma 2.17 since the assumptions imply that M =
ay(x; ) and the product of (X;A) with (x; ) is (X, x;A) (we may assume x /∈ X). We
can also give a direct proof as follows:
The left to right direction is immediate using the inclusion X ↪→ X ∪ {x}. For
the other direction, assume (X, x;A)  ϕ and let f : (Y ;B) → (X;A) in Cts be given
together with a term t ∈ Tm(Y ;B). We then have a commutative triangle
(Y ;B)
(X, x;A) (X;A)
f
[f,x:=t]
so (Y ;B)  ϕ[f, x := t] by monotonicity. In case of Cvs with a purely relational signature,
t is a variable in Y and we can use the same commutative triangle.
Note that in the case of Crn and a purely relational signature this argument would
fail in the case of t being a variable in the image of f , because [f, x := t] would be not
be injective.
We mentioned already in Section 2 that the forcing semantics is sound with respect
to intuitionistic provability. Let us here note that this is with respect to provability
that handles an empty domain in a correct way. For example, let T be the empty
theory over a signature containing a constant c. Consider the trivial covering defined
by (; ) C {id(;) : (; ) → (; )}. We have (; )  >[x = c], so by the definition of forcing
(; )  ∃x.>. The latter does not hold if the signature does not contain a constant. This
means that we have to use a logic that is careful about ∃-introduction, so that ∃x.>
is not provable if there is no constant in the signature. Similar care has to be taken
in connection with ∀. Proof systems that can handle empty domains can be found in
[6, 8, 10, 14]. One way is to define triples Γ `X ϕ where X is a set of variables and Γ, ϕ
are formulas with all free variables in X. The rules for the propositional connectives are
as usual, and the rules for the quantifiers are as follows.
1. Γ `X ∀x.ϕ if Γ `X,x ϕ and x not free in Γ
2. Γ `X ∃x.ϕ if Γ `X ϕ[x := t] and t ∈ Tm(X)
3. Γ `X ϕ[x := t] if Γ `X ∀x.ϕ and t ∈ Tm(X)
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4. Γ `X ϕ if Γ `X ∃x.ψ and Γ, ψ `X,x ϕ and x not free in Γ, ϕ
We shall prove soundness for the full class of possibly infinitary formulas, including (small)
infinitary disjunctions and conjunctions, over the signature including equality. We add
the following rules for introduction and elimination of infinitary disjunctions and con-
junctions:
5. Γ `X
∨
i∈I ϕi if Γ `X ϕi for some i ∈ I.
6. Γ `X ψ if Γ `X
∨
i∈I ϕi and Γ, ϕi `X ψ for all i ∈ I.
7. Γ `X
∧
i∈I ϕi if Γ `X ϕi for all i ∈ I.
8. Γ `X ϕi for all i ∈ I if Γ `X
∧
i∈I ϕi.
Note that by adopting rules 6 and 7 we allow proofs to be infinitary as well.
Theorem 5.5 (Soundness). Let C be one of the categories Crn,Cvs or Cts and let C
be a coverage with forcing relation . If Γ `X ϕ, then for any condition C and any
environment ρ : X → Tm(C) we have C  ϕρ if C  Γρ, that is, if C  ψρ for all ψ ∈ Γ.
Proof. This of course follows from soundness of intuitionistic logic in sheaf semantics
(e.g., [8, D1.3.2] which uses a slightly different proof calculus). There is also a direct
proof by induction on the derivation of Γ `X ϕ (for the case of coherent logic and Crn, cf.
[2]). We provide two samples of induction steps: ∀-introduction (rule 1 above), and ∨i∈I-
elimination (rule 6 above). In both steps we assume C is a condition and ρ : X → Tm(C)
such that C  Γρ (A). If f : D → C, then ρf : X → Tm(D) is defined by (ρf)(x) = ρ(x)f
so that (ϕρ)f = ϕ(ρf) for all ϕ.
Rule 1. Assume soundness has been proven for Γ `X,x ϕ, where x is not free in Γ
(IH). We must prove C  (∀x.ϕ)ρ. Note that x is not in the domain of ρ, so (∀x.ϕ)ρ
is ∀x.(ϕρ). By the definition of forcing we have to prove D  (ϕρ)[f, x := t] for all
f : D → C and t ∈ Tm(D). Let f : D → C and t ∈ Tm(D). Define ρ′ to extend ρf with
value t for variable x, so ρ′ : X, x→ Tm(D). By (A) and the monotonicity of forcing we
get D  Γρf . Hence D  Γρ′, since Γρ′ is Γρf (as x not free in Γ). By (IH) it follows
that D  ϕρ′, which is D  (ϕρ)[f, x := t].
Rule 6. Assume soundness has been proven for Γ `X
∨
i∈I ϕi and Γ, ϕi `X ψ for all
i ∈ I (IH). We must prove C  ψρ. By (IH) we get C  ∨i∈I ϕiρ, which by the definition
of forcing means that there exists U B C such that for every f : D → C in U there exists
i ∈ I with D  ϕiρf . Let f : D → C in U , then D  Γρf by (A) and the monotonicity
of forcing, and hence D  (Γ, ϕi)ρf for some i ∈ I. For any such i we get D  ψρf by
(IH). It follows by local character that C  ψρ.
Corollary 5.6. Using the coverage CT from Definition 3.6 we have that (; )  ϕ if T `∅ ϕ,
for all (not necessarily coherent) sentences ϕ.
Proof. By Theorem 5.5 and the fact that T is forced relative to CT as in Section 3.3.
We now prove the converse of Corollary 5.6 for the class of generalized geometric
implications, cf. Def. 2.18. We first prove the analogue of local character for provability.
20
Lemma 5.7. Let C be one of the categories Crn,Cvs or Cts and T a coherent theory with
corresponding coverage relation C. Assume (X;A) C U and let formula ψ with all free
variables in X be such that for all f : (Y ;B)→ (X;A) in U we have T,B `Y ψf . Then
T,A `X ψ.
Proof. By induction on (X;A) C U . The base case is trivial since the substitution
underlying an isomorphism is a bijective renaming. For the induction step, let (X;A) C U
be inferred by
(X,~x1;A,ϕ1) C U1 . . . (X,~xn;A,ϕn) C Un
(X;A) C
⋃
1≤i≤n(eiUi) = U
(∗)
using an axiom ϕ0 → ∃~x1.ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃~xk.ϕk with ϕ0 ⊆ A. Assume T,B `Y ψf for
all f : (Y ;B) → (X;A) in U , that is, T,B `Y ψeih for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and all h :
(Y ;B) → (X,~xi;A,ϕi) in Ui. By induction hypotheses it follows for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n that
T,A, ϕi `X,~xi ψ (ei does nothing on X, so ψ = ψei). The axiom used to infer (X;A) C U
yields T,A `X ∃~x1.ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃~xk.ϕk. Note that the ~xi do not occur in T,A, ψ, so from
case distinction and existential elimination it follows that T,A `X ψ.
Now we come to our first completeness result, and here it is imperative that equality
is not present in the language.
Theorem 5.8. Let C be one of the categories Crn,Cvs of Cts and T a coherent theory
with corresponding forcing relation . Then for any generalized geometric implication
ϕ in variables Y , any condition (X;A), and any environment ρ : Y → Tm(X) we have
T,A `X ϕρ if (X;A)  ϕρ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ as generated by the grammar in Definition 2.18.
The case of > is trivial. For the other atomic cases, if (X;A)  α, then there exists
U B (X;A) such that for any f : (Y ;B)→ (X;A) in U we have αf ∈ B. Obviously, we
then have T,B `Y αf , so T,A `X ϕ by Lemma 5.7.
The induction step for ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 is obvious.
Assume the result has been proven for ϕi for i ∈ I (IH), and let (X;A) 
∨
i∈I ϕi.
Then there exists U B (X;A) such that for any f : (Y ;B) → (X;A) in U we have
(Y ;B)  ϕif for some i ∈ I. By the induction hypothesis we get for every f in U that
T,B `Y ϕif for some i ∈ I, and hence T,B `Y
(∨
i∈I ϕi
)
f . Now T,A `X
∨
i∈I ϕi follows
by Lemma 5.7.
Assume the result has been proven for ϕ (IH), and let (X;A)  ∀x. ϕ. Then
(X, x;A)  ϕ, so by the induction hypothesis we get T,A `X,x ϕ, and hence T,A `X ∀x. ϕ
since x does not occur in T,A.
Again assume the result has been proven for ϕ (IH), and let (X;A)  ∃x. ϕ. Then
there exists U B (X;A) such that for any f : (Y ;B) → (X;A) in U we have (Y ;B) 
ϕf [x := tx] for some tx ∈ Tm(Y ). By the induction hypothesis we get T,B `Y ϕf [x := tx]
and hence T,B `Y (∃x. ϕ)f . Now T,A `X ϕ follows by Lemma 5.7.
Assume the result has been proven for α and ϕ (IH), and let (X;A)  α → ϕ. We
have to prove T,A `X α → ϕ, and it clearly suffices to prove that T,A, α `X ϕ. The
latter follows easily from the induction hypothesis for ϕ, the definition of forcing, and the
fact that idX : (X;A,α)→ (X;A).
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Corollary 5.9 (Completeness). Let conditions be as above. Then T `∅ ϕ if (; )  ϕ, for
all generalized geometric sentences ϕ.
Remark 5.10. The completeness result depends crucially on the fact that the forcing
conditions do not allow equality facts. E.g., ¬(0 = 1) is forced but not provable, for the
empty theory with two constants, 0 and 1; cf. Example 6.2 below.
To capture the coherent implications with = that hold in our forcing models, we let
T+ denote T= together with the following (coherent) constructor axioms ensuring all
function symbols behave like constructors:
(I) distinct function symbols f, g have disjoint values: f(~x) = g(~y)→ ⊥.
(II) function symbols are injective: f(~x) = f(~y)→ ~x = ~y.
(III) there are no proper cycles: x = f(~s) → ⊥ whenever x occurs anywhere in the
sequence of terms ~s.
It is easy to see that these are all forced in our three models, which thus model T+.
Observe that the base case in the proof of Theorem 5.8 also holds with α an equality
atom and T a coherent theory in logic with equality. (The induction step α → ϕ fails
with α an equality atom since such α’s are not allowed in conditions.) As a consequence,
Theorem 5.8 also holds for coherent theories T+ and geometric implications with =,
as long as the latter have no equations in a negative position. This allows us to handle
geometric sentences (but not all generalized geometric implications) using the (admissible)
Eriksson-Girard elimination rule for equality, i.e., the inference
(I)–(III),Γf `Y ϕf
(I)–(III),Γ, ~s = ~t `X ϕ
whenever f : X → Tm(Y ) is the most general unifier of the equations ~s = ~t, cf. [4, 5].
Theorem 5.11. For all geometric sentences ϕ in logic with equality, we have that T+ `∅ ϕ
if (; )  ϕ, for any of our forcing models.
Proof. Any geometric sentence over the signature of T+ is equivalent to a conjunction
of sentences of the form ∀~x. ~s = ~t → ψ, where ψ is a generalized geometric implication
without any equations in an antecedent.
If the equations ~s = ~t are not unifiable, then T+ `∅ ∀~x. ~s = ~t→ ⊥, and we are done.
Otherwise, let f : X → Tm(Y ) be the most general unifier. From
(; )  ∀~x. ~s = ~t→ ψ,
we get (Y ; )  (~s = ~t)f → ψf simply by using the term substitution f as instantiation for
~x. Since f unifies ~s = ~t, we get (Y ; )  ψf . By the restriction on ψ, we get T+ `Y ψf from
Theorem 5.8. By the Girard-Eriksson rule we conclude T+, ~s = ~t `X ψ, as desired.
Remark 5.12. Because we assume our theory T to be coherent (viz., finitary geometric),
we note that in the completeness results, Theorem 5.8 and Corollary 5.9, the resulting
proof is always finitary as well, by analyzing the rules used.
Thus, if in Theorem 5.11, ϕ has the form (1) (where the disjunction is allowed to be
infinite), then the proof obtained there is finitary.
22
We shall see in the companion paper that Sh(Cts,CT ) is in fact the classifying topos
of T+. As a hint for what happens for the model over Crn, note that the generalized
geometric implication ∀x, y. x = y ∨ (x = y → ⊥) is forced there, so we cannot hope to
extend Theorem 5.11 to generalized geometric implications for this model.
6 Examples
Example 6.1. Consider the empty single-sorted signature with the theory {∃x.>} (ax-
iomatizing an inhabited domain). In this case, Cvs is equivalent to Finop (the opposite
of the category of finite sets and functions) and Crn is equivalent to Finopmon (the opposite
of the category of finite sets and injections). By Theorem 4.3 we have that Sh(Cvs) is
the classifying topos of the theory {∃x.>}=, or, in categorical terminology, for an inhab-
ited object. The coverage on Crn includes all singleton sinks, as any injection between
finite sets is a composition of finitely many embeddings that each add one element with
a bijection. Hence the generated Grothendieck topology is the atomic one consisting of
all inhabited sieves, and we get that Sh(Crn) is the Schanuel topos, classifying infinite
decidable objects, cf. [17, p. 335]. This example shows that the toposes Sh(Crn) and
Sh(Cvs) need not be equivalent.
Example 6.2. Consider the empty theory over the signature consisting of two constant
symbols 0 and 1. Since the theory is empty, the Grothendieck topology of any of the
sites considered in this example is trivial, so that Example 2.7 applies to any of these
sites. Using [3, p. 25], the classifying topos can be presented as PSh(C0), where C0 is the
syntactic site, see Section 4.1. Mapping any object (X;A) of C0 to the set X ∪ {0, 1}
modulo the equalities implied by A, it is easy to see that C0 is equivalent to Finop01 (the
opposite of the category of finite bi-pointed sets), and this topos classifies a bi-pointed
object. Meanwhile, Cvs and Crn are impervious to the constants, so Sh(Cvs) = PSh(Cvs)
is the object classifier and Sh(Crn) = PSh(Crn) classifies decidable objects [8, D3.2.7].
Spitters [16] noted that Sh(Cts) classifies strictly bi-pointed objects (note also that Cts is
equivalent to Finop06=1: the opposite of the category of finite strictly bi-pointed sets). This
example shows that all of these toposes can be different (viz. non-equivalent). Indeed,
consider the string of geometric morphisms (4) in this case ([C,D] denotes the functor
category):
PSh(Crn) PSh(Cvs) PSh(Cts) PSh(C0)
[Finmon,Set] [Fin,Set] [Fin06=1,Set] [Fin01,Set]
Here, Fin → Fin06=1 is the functor that freely adjoins two new elements 0 and 1. The
forgetful functors from Fin06=1 and Fin01 to Fin induce the geometric morphisms from
PSh(Cts) and PSh(C0) to PSh(Cvs) mentioned in Theorem 4.5; these classify the generic
(strictly) bi-pointed object as an object.
Regarding the canonical models, we have in PSh(C0) that ¬¬0 = 1 using (X;A, 0 =
1)→ (X;A), while in PSh(Cts), PSh(Cvs) and PSh(Crn) we have ¬0 = 1.
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In PSh(Cts) we have ∀x.¬¬(x = 0 ∨ x = 1), while in PSh(Cvs) we have on the other
hand ¬∀x.¬¬(x = 0 ∨ x = 1). To see this, use that Tm(X) consists of 0, 1 and x ∈ X,
plus that the term substitution [x := 0] can be used in Cts but not in Cvs.
In PSh(Cvs) we have ¬∀xy. x = y ∨ ¬x = y, while we have ∀xy. x = y ∨ ¬x = y in
PSh(Crn) using Tm(X) as above plus the fact that in Cvs two distinct variables can be
substituted with one variable, whereas in Crn they must remain distinct.
To sum up, these considerations show that the canonical models in these toposes are
different, at least with respect to sentences formulated in logic with equality (and we also
get a new proof that the morphisms in (4) need not be open).
To show that the toposes are actually different (i.e., non-equivalent), we can use the
result that if C is idempotent complete, then it can be recovered up to equivalence from
the presheaf topos PSh(C) [8, Lemma A1.1.10]. Now note that the four categories Finmon,
Fin, Fin06=1, Fin01 (and their opposites) are all idempotent complete and pairwise non-
equivalent. Hence the above presheaf toposes are also pairwise non-equivalent.
Now we turn to purely relational signatures and show that also there we find examples
of (non-coherent) sentences that are forced but not provable, not even classically.
Example 6.3. Let T be the empty theory over a signature with one unary predicate P .
Then the formula ∀x.P (x) is never forced. (X;A)  ∀x.P (x) means by the definition of
forcing that D  P (t) for all g : D → (X;A) and t ∈ Tm(D). Since the theory is empty,
we only have D C {f}, for any isomorphism f : E → D, and no other covers. Now take
D = (X, y;A) with y not in X, and g the identity substitution on X. Clearly, there is
no isomorphism f : E → D such that P (y)f ∈ Af , so not D  P (y) and hence not
(X;A)  ∀x.P (x). Since ∀x.P (x) is never forced, we get that (∀x.P (x)) → ⊥ is forced
by any condition. However, this formula is not classically provable from T .
The argument of the previous example plays an important role in the next, more
interesting example, which reveals a difference between forcing based on Crn and on Cvs.
Lemma 6.4. Let T be the theory with one axiom ∀x, z. P (x)→ (Q(x, z)∨R(x, z)) over
the minimal relational signature in which this axiom can be expressed. Let
ϕ := ∃x, y. (P (x) ∧ P (y) ∧ ¬∀z. (Q(x, z) ∨R(y, z))).
Then vs ¬ϕ, and rn ¬¬ϕ.
Proof. We note first that ⊥ does not occur in T . By a simple induction on the definition
of C C U one can therefore construct an f ∈ U for every U B C (?), so we never have
C  ⊥. By the definition of forcing, vs ¬ϕ means that C vs ⊥ whenever C vs ϕ, i.e.,
that C vs ϕ is absurd. By the definition of forcing (using transitivity of covers for the
iterated existential quantification), C vs ϕ means that for some U B C we have, for all
f : D → C in U ,
D vs P (d1) ∧ P (d2) ∧ ¬∀z. (Q(d1, z) ∨R(d2, z))
for some d1, d2 ∈ Tm(D). By (?) there exist such an f ∈ U . It is an intuitionistic
consequence of the axiom of T that ∀x. P (x) → ∀z.Q(x, z) ∨ R(x, z), so this is forced.
Hence, taking x := d1 at D we get
D vs ∀z. (Q(d1, z) ∨R(d1, z)).
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Since the signature is relational, the terms d1, d2 are variables. We now use a non-injective
substitution equating d1 and d2. Define g : E → D by g(di) = d1 for i = 1, 2, and g the
identity substitution on all other variables in D. By monotonicity of forcing it follows
that
E vs (∀z.Q(d1, z) ∨R(d1, z)) ∧ ¬∀z. (Q(d1, z) ∨R(d1, z)),
which implies E vs ⊥, so by the definition of forcing, E has an empty cover. This
conflicts with (?). Note that we have crucially used a substitution that is not injective.
This means that for rn the situation is completely different.
We prove rn ¬¬ϕ by showing that every condition can be extended to a condition
in which ϕ is forced. Let C be a condition and let D denote the extension of C with
two new variables x, y and corresponding atoms P (x), P (y). Since D rn P (x) ∧ P (y) it
suffices to show that
D rn ¬∀z. (Q(x, z) ∨R(y, z)).
Let g : E → D and assume E rn ∀z. (Q(x, z) ∨R(y, z)). This situation is contradictory
for a subtle reason. If E would extend D with the atom x = y, then there would be no
contradiction at all. However, the language has no equality. If we would have g(x) = g(y),
then again there would be no contradiction at all. However, g must be injective. It turns
out that a contradiction is inevitable under the given conditions.
Like in Example 6.3, extending E with a new variable z leads to a condition F that
cannot possibly force Q(x, z) ∨ R(y, z) (for simplicity of notation we assume that all
renamings are implemented as injections). We must reason carefully since the theory T
contains one axiom, and we can force both Q(x, z) ∨ R(x, z) and Q(y, z) ∨ R(y, z). The
intuition is that this gives four possibilities, one of which, Q(y, z) ∧ R(x, z), does not
force Q(x, z) ∨ R(y, z). Since F rn Q(x, z) ∨ R(y, z) requires a U B F such that for
all g : G → F in U , either G rn Q(x, z) or G rn R(y, z), we arrive at a contradiction
(formally, we argue by induction on U B F ).
Lemma 6.4 gives a coherent theory T and a sentence ¬ϕ that is forced in vs and
hence, by Theorem 4.3, is true in the generic model of T=. Then, of course, ¬¬ϕ is false
in this model. At the same time, the lemma states that ¬¬ϕ is forced in rn. Hence,
by the interplay between soundness and coherent completeness (Corollary 5.9), ¬¬ϕ is
T -redundant, as explained in the Introduction.
At first sight, this theory T and sentence ¬¬ϕ seem to answer Wraith’s question
cited in the introduction. However, there is subtle catch here: Wraith’s question has
been posed in the context of logic with equality, and rn ¬¬ϕ has been shown in a logic
without equality. Moreover, as pointed out in the proof of Lemma 6.4, it is essential for
rn ¬¬ϕ that equality is not in the language. To answer Wraith’s question properly,
we have to show that ¬¬ϕ is T -redundant in intuitionistic logic with equality. But this
follows from our improved completeness result, Theorem 5.11, because for a relational
signature, T+ is the same as T=.
7 Concluding remarks and open problems
We have presented three simple and natural syntactic forcing models for coherent logic,
that do not presuppose that the logic has equality. In a future paper we shall characterize
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each of their sheaf toposes as the classifing topos of a certain extension of the coherent
theory T . We have already seen a glimpse of this in Theorem 5.11, because Sh(Cts,CT )
is the classifying topos of T+.
As an application of our forcing models we have given in Section 6 a coherent theory
T and a sentence ϕ which is T -redundant, yet false in the generic model of T in logic
with equality. This answers in the negative a question by Wraith.
The above example uses predicates other than equality and uses that logic with equal-
ity is conservative over logic without equality. This leads us to the second open problem,
which is the refinement of Wraith’s question for algebraic coherent theories. Given an
algebraic (= purely equational) coherent theory T , are all T -redundant sentences true in
the generic model of T?
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